The authors examine the conditions under which democratic events,
including elections, cabinet formations, and government dissolutions, affect asset
markets.
Where these events have less predictable outcomes, market returns are depressed
and volatility increases. In contrast, where market actors can forecast the result,
returns do not exhibit any unusual behavior. Further, political expectations condition how
markets respond to the political process. When news causes market actors to update their
political beliefs, market actors reallocate their portfolios, and overall market behavior
changes. To measure political information, Professors Bernhard and Leblang employ
sophisticated models of the political process. They draw on a variety of models of market
behavior, including the efficient markets hypothesis, capital asset pricing model, and
arbitrage pricing theory, to trace the impact of political events on currency, stock, and
bond markets.
The analysis will appeal to academics, graduate students, and advanced undergraduates
across political science, economics, and finance.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Democratic processes and political risk: evidence from foreign exchange markets
3. When markets party: stocks, bonds, and cabinet formations
4. The cross-national financial consequences of political predictability
5. Cabinet dissolutions and interest rate behavior
6. Bargaining and bonds: the process of coalition formation and the market for
government debt in Austria and New Zealand
7. Time, shares, and Florida: the 2000 Presidential Election and stock market
volatility
8. Polls and pounds: exchange rate behavior and public opinion in Britain
9. Conclusion: political predictability and financial market behavior.
272 pages, Paperback