AUCTIONS KUŚMIERCZYK P. Księgarnia

Auctions

Introduction 9
Chapter one. Main definitions 13
1.1. What is an auction? 13
1.2. Ascending-bid auction (English auction) 17
1.3. Descending-bid auction (Dutch auction) 19
1.4. First-price sealed-bid auction 20
1.5. Second-price sealed-bid auction (Vickrey auction) 21
1.6. Non-standard type auctions 22
Summary 25
Questions and exercises 25
Chapter two. Optimal bidding in private-value auctions 27
2.1. Goal of the auction’s participant 27
2.2. Optimal bidding in ascending-bid auction 27
2.3. Optimal bidding in first-price auctions 29
2.4. Optimal bidding in second-price sealed-bid auction 35
Summary 37
Questions and exercises 38
Chapter three. Revenue Equivalence Principle 40
3.1. The Theorem 40
3.2. Applications of REP 41
3.3. Risk-aversion 47
3.4. Asymmetric auctions 48
3.5. Budget constraint 49
3.6. Bounded rationality 50
Summary 51
Questions and exercises 52
Chapter four. Reserve price 53
4.1. Optimal value of the reserve price 53
4.2. Practical aspects relied to the reserve price 56
4.3. Hidden reserve price 58
Summary 59
Questions and exercises 59
Chapter five. Common-value and interdependent-values auctions 60
5.1. Common-value auctions and winner’s curse 60
5.2. Interdependent-values auctions 63
5.3. Optimal bidding, prices and seller’s revenues 64
Summary 69
Questions and exercises 69
Chapter six. Procurement auctions 71
6.1. The definition of procurement 71
6.2. The role of the quality parameters 72
6.3. Unknown number of units 77
6.4. Procurement auctions and the auction theory 77
Summary 83
Questions and exercises 83
Chapter seven. Internet auctions 85
7.1. Internet auctions’ platforms 85
7.2. Sniping 86
7.3. Risk factor 89
7.4. Internet auctions with an all-pay rule 89
7.5. Other Internet auctions 92
7.6. E-procurement 93
Summary 95
Questions and exercises 95
Chapter eight. Multi-unit auctions 96
8.1. Main definitions 96
8.2. Uniform-price auction 98
8.3. Multiple-price auction 101
8.4. Demand reduction 104
8.5. Multi-unit Vickrey auction 105
8.6. Clock auction 106
8.7. Simultaneous multiple round ascending auction 108
8.8. Activity rules 111
8.9. The case of voucher privatization in Czechoslovakia 113
Summary 114
Questions and exercises 115
Chapter nine. Combinatorial auctions 117
9.1. Main definitions 117
9.2. Application problems 120
9.3. Combinatorial auctions in practice 121
Summary 123
Questions and exercises 124
Chapter ten. Auctions’ objectives and evaluation criteria 125
10.1. Why Dutch and Vickrey auctions are rarely used in practice 125
10.2. Revenue maximization/cost minimization 127
10.3. Efficiency 127
10.4. Transparency 131
10.5. Other criteria taken into account when designing an auction 133
Summary 135
Questions and exercises 135
Chapter eleven. Practical auction design 137
11.1. Possibility of collusion 137
11.2. Participation costs 140
11.3. Entry deterrence 142
11.4. Comparison of ascending-bid and first-price sealed-bid auction according to the analyzed criteria 145
11.5. UMTS 2000/2001 cases 146
11.6. Role of laboratory experiments in auction design 150
11.7. Troubled asset reverse auction plan in the United States 150
Summary 153
Questions and exercises 153
Chapter twelve. Double auctions 154
12.1. Terminology 154
12.2. The main mechanisms 155
12.3. Practical applications of double auctions 161
Summary 161
Questions and exercises 162
Chapter thirteen. Applications of auction theory in other sciences 163
Summary 166
Questions and exercises 166
Final remarks 167
Solutions to exercises 168
Bibliography 170
Index 172
List of figures 174
List of tables 175

176 pages, Paperback

Po otrzymaniu zamówienia poinformujemy,
czy wybrany tytuł polskojęzyczny lub anglojęzyczny jest aktualnie na półce księgarni.