This book remains one of the
most interesting readings in economics available.
Frank H. Knight was one of
the founders of the so-called Chicago school of economics, of which Milton Friedman and
George Stigler were the leading members from the fifties to the eighties. Knight made his
reputation with his book Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, which was based on his Ph.D.
dissertation. In it Knight set out to explain why perfect competition would not
necessarily eliminate profits. His explanation was "uncertainty," which Knight
distinguished from risk. According to Knight risk refers to a situation where the
probability of an outcome could be determined, and therefore, the outcome could be insured
against. Uncertainty, by contrast, referred to an event whose probability could not be
known. Knight argued that even in long-run equilibrium, entrepreneurs would earn profits
as a return for their putting up with uncertainty. Knight's distinction between risk and
uncertainty is still taught in economics classes today. Knight made three other important
contributions to economics. One was The Economic Organization, a set of lecture notes
originally published in 1933; his famous article, "Some Fallacies in the
Interpretation of Social Cost; " and his work on capital theory in the thirties.
Knight was an economics
professor at the University of Chicago from 1927 until 1955, after which he was emeritus
professor until his death.
Table of Contents
PART ONE: INTRODUCTORY
Chapter I.
The Place of Profit and
Uncertainty in Economic Theory
The nature and necessity of
a deductive science of economics -- Analogy of physical science -- Necessity of
emphasizing the abstract character of hypotheses -- Thought means analysis and analysis
abstraction -- The assumption of perfect competition -- Profit absent -- The conditions of
perfect competition include especially perfect knowledge, and profit is to be explained by
uncertainty -- Plan of the book
Chapter II.
Theories of Profit; Change
and Risk in Relation to Profit
Historical sketch of the
treatment of profit in economic literature -- Special consideration of the Dynamic and the
Risk theories -- The former confuses the effects of change with those of the uncertainty
connected with change -- The latter falls into confusion by failing to distinguish between
risk in the sense of a measurable probability and an uncertainty which cannot be measure
-- Change according to a known law does not give rise to profit, nor does risk if
measurable, since it can be eliminated by insurance or some equivalent device.
PART TWO: PERFECT COMPETITION
Chapter III.
The Theory of Choice and of
Exchange
Wants, and the economic
order as a mechanism for organizing want-satisfying activity -- Conflict of wants --
Resources, and their use to satisfy a plurality of wants -- Utility and Diminishing
Utility -- simple choices; the boy and the berries; Crusoe and the Crusoe economy; the
production and exchange of goods under simplified social conditions -- The problem that of
combining alternatives -- Pleasure and pain relative -- Cost is a sacrificed alternative
-- The true significance of resources and resource costs -- Formulation of the relations
in functions, curves and equilibria.
Chapter IV.
Join Production and
Capitalizatio
The use of a plurality of
kinds of resource in producing various commodities and the resulting problem of
organization -- The law of diminishing returns, analogue of the law of diminishing utility
-- The imputation of product-values to resources or oust goods and resultant placing of
the latter to maximize their yield -- Critique of the productivity theory -- The values of
productive services in terms of demand and supply -- No valid classification of productive
agencies into "factors" is possible -- The role of time in production and the
fallacy of time preference.
Chapter V.
Change and Progress with
Uncertainty Absent
The meaning of static
conditions and the forms of progress -- Question of classifying productive agencies along
conventional tripartite lines -- Changes in supply and demand of productive goods and in
the distributive shares -- Question of progress toward equilibrium levels -- All modes of
progress represent alternative methods of investing present resources for a future gain --
With uncertainty absent the rate of return would be equal in all these fields -- Contrast
with present facts -- The nature of interest as a peculiar form of income, distinguishable
from rent.
Chapter VI.
Minor Prerequisites for
Perfect Competition
Brief consideration of
conditions requisite for perfect competition other than the absence of uncertainty --
Divisibility of elements in the adjustment -- Lack of moral connotation of the term
"productivity" -- Monopoly; various forms; is productive in the economic sense
-- Tendency of a competitive system toward monopoly and a universal dead-lock.
PART THREE: IMPERFECT
COMPETITION THROUGH RISK AND UNCERTAINTY
Chapter VII.
The Meaning of Risk and
Uncertainty
Outlines of a theory of
knowledge -- The role of consciousness in behavior -- Conduct in forward-looking and the
problem of knowledge is prediction -- Knowledge of the future depends on the fact that
expression can be analyzed into the behavior of objects which maintain their identity --
But there are too many of these for our intelligence to handle, so we depend on inferring
one mode of behavior from another, i.e. upon constancy in association of properties --
Generally speaking, exhaustive and quantities analysis is impossible, and we
"estimate" -- Commonly there is a diversity in the possible modes of behavior to
be inferred, and we reason in terms of "probability" of various outcomes --
Probability a priori vs. statistical -- Errors in judgment usually not susceptible to
objective evaluation on any ground, though they are estimated as probabilities -- The
"risks" which give rise to profit are chiefly of the nature of chances of error
in judgment, and hence not measurable, because too unique to form into classes.
Chapter VIII.
Structures and Methods for
Meeting Uncertainty
Attitudes toward uncertainty
-- Variable factors -- Free enterprise -- The economic organization deals with
uncertainty by reducing it or specializing the function of meeting it -- The chief method
of reduction is by consolidation, though important structures exist for perfecting
information and for the direct control of the future -- Insurance the chief device for
consolidation -- Speculation specializes risk, but is fully as important as a means of
consolidation -- Large-scale operation, especially the corporation -- Promotion.
Chapter IX.
Enterprise and Profit
Introduction of uncertainty
into a perfectly equilibrated static society -- Specialization of the function of
management and risk-assumption -- Contractual income and residual income -- Conditions
which control the amount of the profit share, chiefly timidity or, optimism of
entrepreneurs, specially in estimating their own powers -- Supply and demand of
entrepreneur ability.
Chapter X.
Enterprise and Profit
(continued) The Salaried Manager
Indirectness of knowledge
and control -- We generally judge the capacity of someone else to judge for us and not our
problems itself -- In the same way we get things done by getting to do them -- The
characteristic quality of the executive is judgment of men -- The final control is the
selection of men to control in business organization, and this is inseparable from
responsibility -- The distribution of authority and responsibility in the modern business
word.
Chapter XI.
Uncertainty and Social
Progress
Change, the main source of
uncertainty, is the source of the problem of control -- Uncertainty in the investment of
resources give rise to a separation of the function of investment from that of saving --
The theory of interest -- The uncertainty element in relations to the various forms of
progressive change -- Complicated problems arising out of the capitalization of profits --
The permanence of profit; friction and mobility.
Chapter XII.
Social Aspects of
Uncertainty and Profit
All methods of reducing or
redistributing uncertainty involve costs The extent to which they should be carried
depends upon how far uncertainty as such is undesirable Free enterprise concentrates
control and responsibility in the hands of property-owners, and a small class of these
Contrast between free enterprise and freedom From the standpoint of
efficiency alone it is fairly clear that men work more interestedly and effectively for an
uncertain than for a certain reward Question of the aggregate amount of the
profit share All evidence indicates that it is negative Question of abolishing
free enterprise in favor of some other system Largely a problem of getting
those in control of economic activity to feel an independent creative spirit The
great difficulty of control beyond one's own life-time; social continuity and the family
problem.
880 pages