Game Theory
Critical Concepts in the Social Sciences
Edited by: Yanis Varoufakis
Introduced by:
Yanis Varoufakis
Game theory is rapidly becoming one of the cornerstones of the social sciences. The
articles gathered here chart the intellectual history of game theory from its place in the
Enlightenment tradition, through the explosion of literature in the late 1970s, to issues
of current and emerging debates.
This extensively indexed set will be a valuable reference tool to researchers in sociology
and politics, as well as economics.
Contents:
Volume I: Foundations
Part A: Precursors
1. A.A. Cournot Researches in the mathematical principles of the theory of wealth [1960]
2. J. Magnan de Bornier The Cournot-Bertrand debate: a historical perspective History of
Political Economy [1992]
3. E. Borel The theory of play and integral equations with skew symmetric kernels
Econometrica [1953]
4. E. Borel On games that involve chance and the skills of the players Econometrica [1953]
5. J. von Neumann On the theory of games of strategy Contributions to the Theory of Games
[1959]
6. F. Zeuthen Problems of monopoly and economic warfare [1930]
Part B: Pioneers of Game Theory
7. J. Nash Non-co-operative games Annals of Mathematics [1951]
8. J. Nash Equilibrium points in N-person games Proceedings of the National Academy of
Science of the USA [1950]
9. H. Kuhn Extensive form games and the problem of information Contributions to the Theory
of Games [1953]
10. L. Shapley A value for N-person games Contributions to the Theory of Games [1953]
11. L. Shapley and M. Shubik Solutions of N-person games with ordinal utilities
Econometrica [1953]
12. J. Harsanyi A general theory of rational behaviour in game situations Econometrica
[1966]
13. A. Sen Isolation, assurance and the social rate of discount Quarterly Journal of
Economics [1967]
14. R. Aumann Subjectivity and correlation in randomised strategies Journal of
Mathematical Economics [1974]
Part C: Pioneers of Modern Bargaining Theory
15. J. Nash The bargaining problem Econometrica [1950]
16. J. Nash Two-person co-operative games Econometrica [1953]
17. J. Harsanyi A simplified bargaining model for the N-person co-operative game
International Economic Review [1963]
18. J. Harsanyi On the rationality postulates underlying the theory of co-operative games
Journal of Conflict Resolution [1961]
19. R. Bishop A Zeuthen-Hicks theory of bargaining Econometrica [1964]
20. E. Kalai and M. Smorodinski Other solutions to Nash's bargaining problem Econometrica
[1975]
21. A. Roth Individual rationality and Nash's solution to the bargaining problem
Mathematics of Operations Research [1977]
Volume II: Refinements
Part A: Nash's Project Embellished with (Bayesian) Uncertainty
22. J. Harsanyi Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players: Parts I,II
and III Management Science [1967/8]
23. J. Harsanyi Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy
equilibrium points International Journal of Game Theory [1973]
24. J. Harsanyi The tracing procedure: a Bayesian approach to defining a solution for
N-person non-co-operative games International Journal of Game Theory [1975]
25. R. Aumann Correlated equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian rationality Econometrica
[1987]
26. R. Myerson Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept International Journal of Game
Theory [1978]
Part B: Dynamic Games
27. E. Kohlberg Repeated games with absorbing states Annals of Statistics [1974]
28. R. Selten Re-examination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in
extensive games International Journal of Game Theory [1975]
29. D. Kreps and R. Wilson Sequential equilibria Econometrica [1982]
30. D. Kreps, P. Milgrom, D. Roberts and R. Wilson Rational co-operation in finitely
repeated prisoners' dilemmas Journal of Economic Theory [1982]
31. D. Fudenberg and E. Maskin The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with
incomplete information Econometrica [1986]
32. D. Kreps and G. Ramey Structural consistency, consistency, and sequential rationality
Econometrica [1987]
33. J. Banks and J. Sobel Equilibrium selection in signalling games Econometrica [1987]
Part C: Dynamic Bargaining
34. J. Harsanyi and R. Selten A generalised Nash solution for two-person bargaining games
with incomplete information Management Science [1972]
35. A. Rubinstein Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model Econometrica [1982]
36. A. Rubinstein A bargaining model with incomplete information about preferences
Econometrica [1985]
37. K. Binmore, A. Rubinstein and A. Wolinsky The Nash bargaining solution in economic
modelling Rand Journal of Economics [1986]
38. A. Admati and M. Perry Strategic delay in bargaining Review of Economic Studies [1987]
39. F. Gul and H. Sonnenschein On delay in bargaining with one-sided uncertainty
Econometrica [1987]
Part D: Evolutionary Games
40. J. Maynard Smith and G. Price The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflict
Journal of Theoretical Biology [1974]
41. D. Friedman Equilibrium in evolutionary games: some experimental results The Economic
Journal [1996]
42. H. Young An evolutionary model of bargaining Journal of Economic Theory [1993]
Part E: Psychological Games
43. T. Schelling Egonomics or the art of self management American Economic Review [1978]
44. J. Geanakoplos, D. Pearce and E. Stacchetti Psychological games and sequential
rationality Games and Economic Behaviour [1989]
45. M. Rabin Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics American Economic
Review [1993]
Volume III
Part I: Economic Applications
Part A: Oligopolistic Games
46. R. Selten The chain store paradox Theory and Decision [1978]
47. R. Radner Collusive behaviour in non co-operative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies
with long but finite lives Journal of Economic Theory [1980]
48. A. Dixit The role of investment in entry-deterrence The Economic Journal [1980]
49. D. Kreps and R. Wilson Reputation and entry imperfect information Journal of Economic
Theory [1982]
50. D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole A signal-jamming theory of predation Rand Journal of
Economics [1986]
51. J. Farrell Cheap talk, co-ordination and entry Rand Journal of Economics [1987]
Part B: Auctions
52. W. Vickrey Counter speculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders Journal of
Finance [1961]
53. R. Wang Common-value auctions with discrete private information Econometrica [1991]
Part C: Macroeconomic Games
54. I. McDonald and R. Solow Wage bargaining and employment American Economic Review
[1981]
55. D. Backus and J. Driffill Inflation and reputation American Economic Review [1985]
56. J. Rotemberg and G. Saloner A Supergame-theoretic model of price wars during booms
American Economic Review [1986]
Part D: General Equilibrium and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
57. G. Debreu and H. Scarf A limit theorem on the core of an economy International
Economic Review [1963]
58. M. Satterthwaite Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and
correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions Journal of
Economic Theory [1975]
Part II: Game Theory and the Social Sciences
Part A: Political Science
59. J. Harsanyi Can the maximin principle serve as a basis for morality? A critique of
John Rawls' theory American Political Science Review [1975]
60. D. Gauthier Rational co-operation Nous [1974]
61. W. Riker The entry of game theory into political science Toward a History of Game
Theory [1992]
62. M. Yaari Rawls, Edgeworth, Shapley, Nash: theories of distributive justice re-examined
Journal of Economic Theory [1981]
63. H. Moulin Dominance solvable voting schemes Econometrica [1979]
Part B: Analytical Marxism
64. J. Roemer New directions in the Marxian theory of exploitation and class Politics and
Society [1982]
65. J. Elster Marxism, functionalism and game theory Theory and Society [1982]
66. E. Wood Rational choice Marxism: is the game worth the candle? New Left Review [1989]
Part C: Sociology and Anthropology
67. J. Harsanyi Measurement of social power, opportunity costs, and the theory of
two-person bargaining games Behavioral Science [1962] And J. Harsanyi Measurement of
social power in n-person reciprocal power situations Behavioral Science [1962]
68. J. Harsanyi A bargaining model for social status in informal groups and formal
organisations Behavioral Science [1966]
69. C. Camerer Gifts as economic signals and social symbols American Journalof Sociology
[1988]
Volume IV: Discontents
Part A: The Trouble with Consistently Aligned Beliefs
70. R. Aumann Agreeing to disagree Annals of Statistics [1976]
71. B. Bernheim Rationalizable strategic behavior Econometrica [1984]
72. J. Geanakoplos Common knowledge Journal of Economic Perspectives [1992]
Part B: The Problem With Backward Induction
73. K. Binmore Modelling rational players: part 1 Economics and Philosophy [1987]
74. P. Pettit and R. Sugden The backward induction paradox Journal of Philosophy [1989]
Part C: The Problem with Bargaining Solutions
75. P. Reny Backward induction, normal form perfection and explicable equilibria
Econometrica [1992]
76. R. Sugden Convention, creativity and conflict Conflict in Economics [1990]
77. R. Sugden Rational bargaining Foundations of Decision Theory [1991]
Part D: Philosophical Queries
78. W. Spohn How to make sense of game theory Philosophy of Economics [1982]
79. M. Hollis Penny pinching and backward induction Journal of Philosophy [1991]
80. M. Hollis and R. Sugden Rationality in action Mind [1993]
1640 pages
