The Political Economy of
Capital Controls
Gunther G. Schulze
Description
Although globalisation is
seen by many as the key economic trend of recent times, restrictions on international
capital movements remain the norm in international finance. In 1996 144 out of 186
countries maintained capital controls (IMF). Yet the vast majority of economists object to
most controls on capital movement, arguing that they distort the allocation of capital and
allow opportunities for fraud. What leads governments to impose restrictions on
international capital movements? In this, the first study of capital controls, Gunther
Schulze uses a public choice model to explain this behaviour. He considers the many
aspects of capital controls, including: quantitative measurements of capital controls,
evasion, mis-invoicing, the interaction between an investigating government and an evader,
and the role capital controls play in helping governments meet their macroeconomic
objectives. In addition to the theoretical and policy discussions the book also contains a
comprehensive survey of the existing literature.
Reviews
'Gunther Schulze covers
a wide range of theories on the motivations for capital controls and why they might fail.
His eclectic work encompasses models of taxation drawn from real trade theory as well as
from international money and finance. Always, the political-economic motivations of
governments restricting capital flows, and the likely welfare consequences, get centre
stage. A welcome consolidation and analytica elaboration of hitherto diffused writings in
a most important area of international development.' Professor Ronald McKinnon,
Stanford University
'This book provides a
welcome analysis of international capital controls to complement the political-economy
view of international trade policies. Traditional efficiency-related reasons for capital
controls are examined and are found to be less effective in explaining observed policies
than distributional consequences of capital movements. An extensive range of theoretical
and empirical issues is investigated, including illegal avoidance and measurement of the
effectiveness of capital controls. Throughout there is no presumption that, if a
government has imposed capital controls, it must necessarily have done so in the best
interests of society at large. Gunther Schulze has provided a comprehensive study of a
topic that has not previously benefited from the insights of a political-economy
perspective.' Arye L. Hillman, William Gittes Professor of International Economics,
Bar-Ilan University, Israel
Chapter Contents
1. Introduction:
Part I. The Reasons for
Capital Controls: 2. Political-economic determinants of capital controls; 3. Capital
controls in a small open economy; 4. Extensions: large open economy and unemployment
Part II. The Evasion of
Capital Controls: 5. Ways and means to escape the restrictions; 6. Misinvoicing
international trade: imports; 7. Misinvoicing international trade: exports;
Part III. Empirical
Measurement of the Effectiveness of Capital Controls: 8. The effects of capital
controls-unexploited profit opportunities; 9. Return differentials; 10. The correlation of
saving and investment; 11. Finale.
298 pages