Europe’s financial crisis cannot be blamed on the
Euro, Harold James contends in this probing exploration of the whys, whens, whos, and
what-ifs of European monetary union. The current crisis goes deeper, to a series of
problems that were debated but not resolved at the time of the Euro’s invention.
Since the 1960s, Europeans had been looking for a
way to address two conundrums simultaneously: the dollar’s privileged position in the
international monetary system, and Germany’s persistent current account surpluses in
Europe. The Euro was created under a politically independent central bank to meet the
primary goal of price stability. But while the monetary side of union was clearly
conceived, other prerequisites of stability were beyond the reach of technocratic central
bankers. Issues such as fiscal rules and Europe-wide banking supervision and regulation
were thoroughly discussed during planning in the late 1980s and 1990s, but remained in the
hands of member states. That omission proved to be a cause of crisis decades later.
Here is an account that helps readers understand
the European monetary crisis in depth, by tracing behind-the-scenes negotiations using an
array of sources unavailable until now, notably from the European Community’s Committee
of Central Bank Governors and the Delors Committee of 1988–89, which set out the plan
for how Europe could reach its goal of monetary union. As this foundational study makes
clear, it was the constant friction between politicians and technocrats that shaped the
Euro. And, Euro or no Euro, this clash will continue into the future.
List of Figures vii
Foreword Mario Draghi Jaime Caruana ix
Abbreviations Used in Text xiii
Introduction: The Making of a Non-National Currency
1
1 A Napoleonic Prelude 29
2 The Origins of the Committee of Governors 36
3 The Response to Global Monetary Turbulence 62
4 The Snake and Other Animals 89
5 Negotiating the European Monetary System 146
6 The Malaise of the 1980s 181
7 The Delors Committee and the Relaunching of
Europe 210
8 Designing a Central Bank 265
9 The EMS Crises 324
Conclusion: The Euro and the Legacy of the
Committee of Governors 382
Appendix A Maastricht Treaty Text and Committee of Governors' Draft of the Statute of
the European Monetary Institute 403
Appendix B Maastricht Treaty Text and Committee of Governors' Draft of the Statute of
the European Central Bank 425
Appendix C Dramatis Personae 463
Appendix D Members of the Committee of Governors 477
Appendix E Committee for the Study of Economic and
Monetary Union (Delors Committee), 1988-1989 481
Appendix F Chairmen of the Monetary Committee of
the European Community, 1958-1998 483
Appendix G European Commission Presidents and
Commissioners for Economics and Finance, 1958- 485
Appendix H Chronology 487
Appendix I Interest Rates and Fiscal Balance 499
Notes 505
Acknowledgments 557
Index 559
592 pages, Hardcover